Essays
Scapegoating labour: A favourite pastime during a downturn
, 06/04/2011
Crises are the opportunists’ delight. Recall how a few minutes after the second airplane struck the World Trade Centre, a New Labour spin doctor sent a memo around encouraging various government departments to bring out ‘bad news’ stories, hoping that the fallout from New York would hide them from public view long enough to defuse […]
The Empire is Striking Back, gross failure continues to be handsomely rewarded, and the world economy struggles to find its footing without the Global Minotaur.
, 03/04/2011
That the Empire has struck back there is no doubt. Goldman Sachs’ Lloyd C. Blankfein just rewarded himself with $19 million bonus for 2010: the year during which he appeared in front of a Senate Committee, a court , an SEC investigation revealing in full technicolor the great variety in which GS broke the law, manipulated […]
A fresh rationale for, and a new variant (Version 2.1) of, The Modest Proposal for Overcoming the Euro Crisis
, 24/03/2011
By Yanis Varoufakis and Stuart Holland, 24th March 2011 Introduction to the new version of the Modest Proposal (to go straight to Version 2.1 of the Proposal, click here) The response to our Modest Proposal Version 2.0, of 10th March, has been overwhelming with more than 100 thousand downloads within a few days. As if […]
George Soros sides with the basic tenets of the Modest Proposal 2.0
, 22/03/2011
In yesterday’s FT, George Soros sided with two of three main policies in our Modest Proposal 2.0 and took a position largely in tune with our third policy. First, he agreed that the current euro crisis is significantly a banking crisis and, thus, adopted the policy (that the Modest Proposal 2.0 first made) that the […]
Too kind on Geithner? Stress tests and bank recapitalisation in the US and in Europe
, 18/03/2011
James Galbraith, in a private communication, raised a justified concern over my point that the US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner imposed proper stress tests on the US banks in 2009 and proceeded with their recapitalisation – unlike the Europeans who are allowing Europe’s banks to be zombies for ever and ever. James told me that […]
How exactly did the US Treasurer, Tim Geithner, recapitalise US banks? A comparison with Europe's 'strategy'
, 18/03/2011
In my last post, I compared the US and the EU approach to the post-2008 banking crisis, suggesting that Europe perpetuates the zombie state of its banks. Here are relevant extracts from Chapter 7 of my forthcoming Global Minotaur:
What should we do with Europe's zombie banks?
, 16/03/2011
I think that regular readers can predict my answer. It is the one that in fact any banker would, in a fit of honesty, give you: Non-performing loans must be deleted from the banks’ books. Same with derivatives that stand no chance of finding a market/buyer. These nonperforming paper assets weigh banks down and ensure […]
Tobin's tax and the parlous state of our European democracy
, 15/03/2011
Did you know that the Greek government managed, through heroic and brilliant bargaining, to extract from the latest Eurozone Summit an agreement that the Tobin tax will, at long last, see the light of day – at least in the eurozone? Well, nor did I. But apparently, this is precisely what happened, if the Greek […]
The ECB's new role, as foreshadowed in the Modest Proposal: Q&A with a reader
, 14/03/2011
In this post I continue my Q&A with Manos Makrakis on our Modest Proposal 2.0. Tomorrow I continue with some important points raised by Jan Toporowski.
Breaking News: No Redemption for Greece, for Ireland or for Europe. And an interesting query regarding the ECB's role under the Modest Proposal
, 12/03/2011
Sad news from the EU summit (that the media are presenting as yet another ‘breakthrough’): Just heard the news that our EU leaders are making progress in reaching an agreement on extending the Greek EU-IMF loan repayments by a few years and reducing the interest rates for Ireland by 1%. The possibility of allowing the […]
The Minotaur’s Global Legacy, Part E – The rise of China
, 08/03/2011
In today’s post I conlcude the region-by-region assessment of the impact of the Global Minotaur’s demise post-2008. Previsously, we delved into the triangular relationship between Japan, East Asia and the USA, recalled Germany’s peculiar engagement with the rest of Europe (see here) and, lastly, re-visited the eurozone crisis.
The Minotaur’s Global Legacy, Part D – A brief history of a very European debacle
, 07/03/2011
The region by region assessment of the impact of the Global Minotaur’s demise post-2008 today proceeds to an analysis of the eurozone crisis. Having just looked at the story of Germany’s European engagement (see here), and after having scrutinised the triangular relationship between Japan, East Asia and the USA), we are (I hope) ready for a […]
The Minotaur’s Global Legacy, Part C – Germany's Europe
, 06/03/2011
The region by region assessment of the impact of the Global Minotaur’s demise post-2008 continues in today’s post with a close look at Germany and its attempt to remould Europe in its image. (The last posts looked at developments in the triangular relationship between Japan, East Asia and the USA).
The Minotaur’s Global Legacy, Part B – Wounded tigers: Japan, America and the South East Asian crisis
, 05/03/2011
Today I continue with a region by region assessment of the impact of the Global Minotaur’s demise post-2008. The last post looked at Japan. This one focuses on the nexus between Japan, SE Asia and the USA
The Minotaur's Global Legacy, Part A: The Dimming Sun
, 03/03/2011
On 25th March, European leaders have promised us a comprehensive solution to the eurozone risis. I am not holding my breath but, at the same time, I am redrafting the Modest Proposal for resolving the crisis. It will appear in this blog next week. In the meantime, I return to my Global Minotaur theme. The […]
The Road to Bankruptocracy: How events since 2009 have led to a new mode of reproduction
, 02/03/2011
Today I am continuing the narrative of my forthcoming book The Global Minotaur. The last post on the matter chronicled the Crash of 2008 (for all the previous posts on the Minotaur click this archive). My chronicleended abruptly and arbitrarily toward the middle of 2009. It reads like a breathless horror story. Unlike its Hollywood equivalents, […]
Of Debts and Faultlines: Greece and the Euro Crisis in a Global Context
, 28/02/2011
On Thursday 24/2, a one day workshop was organised by the European Union Studies Centre and the National Seoul University (S. Korea) at the latter’s campus in Seoul. The title of the workshop was: Crisis and the future of European Integration: Implications for Asia. I was honoured with an invitation to open the workshop. Here […]
The Crash of 2008 – lest we forget
, 26/02/2011
So far (see the category The Global Minotaur), we have seen examined the constituent parts of the peculiar global surplus recycling mechanism of the second postwar phase (to which I have given the label Global Minotaur). We saw how it caused financialisation and the global imbalances that everyone is talking about today. Then, all of […]
The fifth of the Global Minotaur's Handmaidens: Toxic economic theory
, 22/02/2011
The last two posts examined four important contributors to the Global Minotaur: to America’s astonishing pre-2008 capacity to attract financing from the capital surpluses of the rest of the world sufficient for the purposes of funding its expanding twin deficits. They were, in turn, (a) the mergers and acquisitions drive, (b) hedging and leverage, (c) The Wal-Mart business model […]
The Minotaur’s Handmaidens Part B: The Wal-Mart business model and Wall Street’s toxic money
, 18/02/2011
In The Minotaur’s Handmaidens Part A, my last post, I looked at two important contributors to the Global Minotaur: to America’s astonishing pre-2008 capacity to attract financing from the capital surpluses of the rest of the world sufficient for the purposes of funding its expanding twin deficits. These two contributors were, on the one hand, the […]
The Minotaur's Handmaidens Part A: Mergers and take overs, Hedging and Leverage
, 16/02/2011
The last post presented the Global Minotaur as a peculiar, yet powerful, Global Surplus Recycling Mechanism (GSRM). Now, I move on to a discussion of the various submechanisms by which the US twin deficits managed to attract financing from the capital surpluses of the rest of the world so that this strange GSRM could operate […]
The Global Minotaur as a most peculiar Global Surplus Recycling Mechanism
, 15/02/2011
Continuing with the story of the Global Minotaur, today’s post looks at it as a most peculiar Global Surplus Recycling Mechanism .(to get up to speed on what this mechanism might be all about, click here) Following the collapse of the Global Plan in 1971, by the end of the 1970s America’s twin deficits had started […]
What attracted so much capital to New York, prior to 2008? The Global Minotaur’s charms
, 13/02/2011
My last post introduced readers to the Global Minotaur, the dynamic by which America’s twin deficits became a mighty ‘beast’ that performed to crucial functions after 1971: First, they provided Japan and Europe with the requisite demand for their industrial surpluses. Secondly, to finance these deficits (US government and trade deficits), the United States managed […]
Surplus recycling, currency unions and the birth of the Global Minotaur
, 10/02/2011
In yesterday’s post, I began to tell the tale of how the USA planned and implemented a Global Plan for the world economy, placing the US administration at the heart of a global Surplus Recycling Mechanism. Today, I have two offerings: One is a brilliant paper by George Krimpas which states the case for such […]